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Abstract When reaching goals, organisms must simulta-
neously meet the overarching goal of conserving energy.
Accordingtothelawofleasteffort,organismswillselectthe
means associated with the least effort. The mechanisms
underlyingthis biasremainunknown.One hypothesisisthat
organisms come to avoid situations associated with unnec-
essary effort by generating a negative valence toward the
stimuli associated with suchsituations. Accordingly,merely
using a dysfunctional, ‘slow’ computer mouse causes par-
ticipants to dislike ambient neutral images (Study 1). In
Study 2, nonsense shapes were liked less when associated
with effortful processing (135 of mental rotation) versus
easier processing (45 of rotation). Complementing ‘ﬂu-
ency’ effects found in perceptuo-semantic research, valence
emerged from action-related processing in a principled
fashion. The ﬁndings imply that negative valence associa-
tions may underlie avoidance motivations, and have prac-
tical implications for educational/workplace contexts in
which effort and positive affect are conducive to success.
Keywords Processing ﬂuency  Effort 
Law of least effort  Valence
Introduction
When reaching goals by acting upon the world, organisms
must simultaneously strive to meet the overarching goal of
conserving energy. It would be detrimental for organisms
to expend energy indiscriminately, either for physical
actions such as moving and negotiating objects or mental
actions such as solving puzzles, sustaining attention, or
mentally rotating objects in one’s mind. According to the
law of least effort (or ‘work’; Botvinick 2007; Hull 1943),
faced with several ways to reach the same end, an organism
will select the means associated with the least expenditure
of effort. The actual mechanisms giving rise to this strong
and most basic of human biases remain unknown. One
possibility is that we explicitly assess how much effort is
associated with each means of reaching a goal and then
select the one associated with the least amount of effort.
Such an algorithm for selecting the path of least resistance
would be computationally challenging, potentially requir-
ing episodic memory and simulations of actions and their
consequences (Arkin 1998; Schacter and Addis 2007).
Alternatively, it has been hypothesized that an organism
comes to avoid situations associated with the expenditure
of effort in a more reﬂexive manner—by automatically
generating a negative valence toward the stimuli associated
with such situations (Botvinick 2007; Hull 1943; Lewin
1935). This valence from effort hypothesis addresses a
basic aspect of the human condition, one that predicts and
explains action selection across a wide variety of contexts.
The hypothesis predicts both conscious and unconscious
(Bargh and Morsella 2008; Morsella and Bargh in press)
preferences toward cognitive and behavioral tasks featur-
ing little effort, over those tasks that are needlessly
effortful. Accordingly, in everyday life, it seems that one
does avoid objects and situations associated with excess
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slow computer that always crashes, and contexts in which
one must perform effortful mental transformations (e.g.,
unnecessarily translating between languages). But do the
preferences in these anecdotes really indicate that one
generates a negative valence toward stimuli associated with
effortful overt action (e.g., physical movement) and covert
action (e.g., rotating mental imagery)? For instance, does
pushing the cart with the bad wheel increase one’s dislike
for the store products that happen to fall upon the eye?
Some research hints that the answer is yes. For example,
in perception research, it has been shown that processing
generates positive affect when it is smooth and facile, as
during the processing of visual stimuli that are familiar,
prototypical, or easy to perceive (e.g., high ﬁgure-ground
contrast; Jacoby et al. 1989; Winkielman et al. 2003). Such
effects of processing ﬂuency have been found in domains
outside of vision (Alter and Oppenheimer 2006; Garbarino
and Edell 1997; Jacoby et al. 1989; Janiszewski and Meyvis
2001;L u c e1998; Luce et al. 1997; Oppenheimer 2006,
2008; Reber et al. 1998; Schwarz 2004) (For a thorough
review of processing ﬂuency effects, see Alter and
Oppenheimer 2009). For instance, research on consumer
behavior has revealed valence effects from the effortful
processing associated with challenging language or brand
names (Alter and Oppenheimer 2006; Garbarino and Edell
1997; Luce 1998; Luce et al. 1997; Oppenheimer 2006;
Schwarz 2004). In general, positive affect and more liking
are associated with ﬂuent, or less effortful, processing.
Importantly, most research has documented valence
effects from the effort associated with the input, stimulus-
end of processing; much less is known about valence effects
from effort associated more with the output, action-end of
processing (Morsella 2009; Rosenbaum 2005), stages of
processing proposed to be associated with the highest levels
of subjective effort (Morsella et al. 2009b; Sanders 1983).
Regarding these stages of processing, the theoretical per-
spectives and empirical evidence are mixed. On one hand, it
has been shown that people prefer situations and stimuli that
require little response interference/conﬂict (Higgins 2005;
Rosen et al. 2007; Winkielman et al. 2003). For example,
Beilock and Holt (2007) showed that skilled typists prefer
letter strings that, when typed using standard typing meth-
ods, engender little or no motor interference (e.g., the visual
stimulus FJ would be preferred over FV). Typists were
unaware of the motoric-based reason for their preference.
Moreover, Fenske and Raymond (2006) have demonstrated
that visual stimuli (e.g., abstract patterns) can acquire a
negative valence if they must be ignored or suppressed,
which involves cognitive effort. Thus, regarding the
response-end of processing, positive affect and more liking
appear to be generally associated with ﬂuent, or less
effortful, processing.
On the other hand, a wealth of research supports a view
that difﬁcult (but not excessively difﬁcult) goal pursuit
enhances the desirability of end-states (Brehm and Self
1989; Brehm et al. 1983; Wright 1996). In this research
tradition on motivational intensity and energization, it is
consistently found that when the actions needed to
accomplish a goal are challenging (versus easy or impos-
sibly difﬁcult), the goal is more desirable (Friedman et al.
1968), suggesting that effortful action is motivating and
generates positive valence. Similarly, hungry participants
found a sandwich to be more attractive when success at an
effortful (versus easy) cognitive task was necessary to
obtain it (Biner et al. 1991). At ﬁrst glance, these effects
appear at odds with the ﬂuency literature, in which effortful
processing is associated with negative affect, decreased
liking, and lowered evaluations of difﬁcult-to-process
information (cf. Alter and Oppenheimer 2006). See
‘‘General discussion’’ for a treatment of how these two
lines of research may be accurately describing different
aspects of the same process of goal-pursuit.
Given the ambiguity in the literature, empirical evidence
is needed to verify the notion that effortful overt and covert
actions automatically generate a negative valence that can
then inﬂuence liking toward ambient stimuli. It is important
to note that the aforementioned valence effects in the lit-
erature stem from phenomena that are fundamentally dif-
ferent in nature from the kinds of quotidian, brute exertions
of effort mentioned above (e.g., pushing a shopping cart
with a faulty wheel). For example, valence data from
response interference may reﬂect more than just the effects
of mental effort, as it is well known that response inter-
ference tasks also include activation of a host of executive
processes and the suppression of often pre-potent action
plans (Cohen et al. 1990; DeSoto et al. 2001; MacLeod and
McDonald 2000). Thus, one question that remains unan-
swered is whether brute effort alone, covarying with stages
of processing related to the execution of physical or covert
actions (e.g., manipulating an object physically or men-
tally), generates a negative valence toward the ambient
stimuli associated with those actions. If so, this would
support a view that the negative affect generated by effort is
one of the sources of avoidance motivation.
To address this gap in the literature, in Study 1 we
examined whether the effort required to move an object can
generate a negative valence toward an ambient visual
stimulus. Speciﬁcally, we evaluated whether moving an
object displayed on the computer screen with a ‘slow’
computer mouse generates a negative valence toward an
ambient ﬁgure presented on the same screen. This task
captures key features of our shopping cart example. This
basic ﬁnding would contribute to the literatures on moti-
vation and goal pursuit (Gollwitzer et al. 2009; Higgins
1987; Kruglanski and Kopetz 2009; Lewin 1935) and on
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the ﬁrst demonstration of valence effects from effort at the
level of action implementation, in a situation capturing the
features of the everyday examples mentioned above. In
Study 2, we extended our investigation by examining not
the effects of moving an object physically, but the effects
stemming from manipulating and negotiating an object
mentally. In this study, we examined the valence effects
stemming from the act of mental rotation. In one condition,
the object could be rotated mentally with little mental
effort; in another condition, the mental rotation demanded
more effort. We predicted that, based on the hypothesis of
valence from effort, the second condition would lead to
less liking of the objects. This study builds on previous
research (e.g., Morsella et al. 2009b) and theories (Bargh
and Morsella 2008; Vygotsky 1962) suggesting that covert
actions have the same subjective properties as overt
actions. Taken together, these investigations demonstrate
that features of situations involving the unnecessary
expenditure of effort acquire a negative valence, an effect
that may be a source of avoidance motivations.
Study 1
Overview and rationale
Using a computer mouse, participants were instructed to
‘drag’ the image of a square diagonally from the top left
corner of the computer screen to the bottom right corner,
much in the way that one manipulates the icons on a
desktop computer. For half of the session, the computer
mouse performed normally (the Easy condition); during the
other half of the session, the mouse became a ‘slow’ mouse
(the Effortful condition), which demanded more correcting
and jerking actions from the participant. On each trial,
following the dragging action, participants were asked to
rate how much they liked a nonsense ﬁgure that was pre-
sented on the screen. According to the valence from effort
hypothesis, the exertion of effort at the level of action
implementation should generate a negative valence that
then inﬂuences likeability of the ﬁgure. Hence, we pre-
dicted that valence would spill over onto this ﬁgure,
making participants prefer (i.e., like) ambient shapes in the
Effortful condition less than shapes in the Easy condition.
Method
Participants
San Francisco State University undergraduates (n = 47)
participated in a within-subjects design for course credit.
For reasons explained below, the data from three partici-
pants were excluded from analysis.
Procedures
By interacting with items on the computer desktop in much
the same manner that one drags ﬁle icons from one desktop
location to another (e.g., from the desktop into a folder),
participants manipulated (or ‘dragged’) an image on the
computer screen with either a normal (Easy condition, a
block of 32 trials) or slow (Effortful condition; 32 trials)
computer mouse. After this act, they rated how much they
liked the nonsense ﬁgure that happened to be presented on
the screen (see example in Fig. 1b). At the beginning of
Fig. 1 Sample screen
environment at the beginning of
a trial (a) and toward the end of
the same trial (b), after the
image of the square had been
dragged diagonally across the
screen
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123each trial the ﬁgure to be rated was occluded by the image
of a square (Fig. 1a). Participants were instructed to drag
the occluding square away from the ﬁgure, moving the
square diagonally from the top left corner of the screen to
the bottom right corner (Fig. 1b). This action revealed the
image of the ﬁgure to be rated. Participants then rated how
much they liked the ﬁgure on a 1–8 scale, in which 1
signiﬁed ‘‘Not at all,’’ and 8 signiﬁed ‘‘Extremely like it.’’
All stimuli were presented in Microsoft Power Point. The
nonsense ﬁgures came from a previous study (Morsella and
Bargh 2007); they were selected because they do not
resemble any objects from everyday life.
Participants were run individually in a booth equipped
with a computer and a booklet in which participants jotted
their ratings. To match the ﬁgures to the recorded ratings,
ratings were jotted down next to a number that corre-
sponded to the number presented on the square on the
screen. Participants never saw the same image twice. In
this within-subjects design, order of condition and pairings
of ﬁgures in the two conditions were fully counter-bal-
anced across participants. Across participants, each ﬁgure
was presented in each condition (Easy and Effortful) an
equal number of times. To eradicate any stimulus order-of-
presentation effects, stimuli were presented in four pseudo-
random ordered sequences. Two of the sequences pre-
sented the stimuli in the reverse order of the other two of
the sequences.
Effort was manipulated by varying the ﬂuidity with
which participants could operate the computer mouse. The
tracking speed of the mouse cursor was adjusted by the
experimenter, using Hotkey gPhotoShow (2008) software.
The software enabled the experimenter to switch quickly
between the two custom mouse settings. To change the
settings discreetly and direct participants’ attention away
from the experimenter, while changing the settings the
experimenter asked participants to conﬁrm their subject-
pool number. In the Easy condition, the mouse moved at
standard speed; in the Effortful condition, it was set to the
slowest tracking speed. If during the session participants
ever asked about the faulty computer mouse, they were told
to continue the session and to reserve all questions until the
end of the session. After the session, participants com-
pleted a funneled debrieﬁng questionnaire designed to
probe for suspiciousness about the purpose of the study
(following the procedures of Bargh and Chartrand 2000).
Speciﬁcally, participants were asked What do you think the
purpose of this experiment was?, What do you think this
experiment was trying to study?, Did the task require any
effort?, Do you recall in which circumstances it did require
effort?, and What did you usually base your liking judg-
ments on? Importantly, although each participant reported
more frustration for Effortful than Easy conditions, none
inferred the hypothesis being tested.
Results and discussion
The data from three participants were excluded from
analysis because one participant used the keyboard
instead of the computer mouse; one changed the mouse
settings; and one participant jotted down ratings for only
one condition. As predicted, mean liking of nonsense
images was lower for Effortful (M = 3.34, SEM = 0.14)
than for Easy conditions (M = 3.52, SEM = 0.15),
t(43) = 2.219, p\0.05 (gp
2 = 0.10). The size of the
effect (gp
2 = 0.10), and variability in the Effortful condi-
tion (SD = 0.93), may reﬂect the fact that not all par-
ticipants responded in the same manner to the Effortful
condition: there was some evidence supporting the
hypothesis that some of the participants may have gen-
erated a positive valence from the expenditure of effort.
This raises the interesting question of whether individual
differences (e.g., need for cognition; Cacioppo and Petty
1982) may account for a meaningful part of responsive-
ness to more effortful versus less effortful action. Fur-
thermore, such a pattern may support a view that effortful
goal related action can produce positive affect and
approach motivation (cf. Brehm and Self 1989). Because
this study was not designed to elicit positive valence from
those people who may have a positive disposition toward
the expenditure of effort, we leave this issue to future
investigations. Nevertheless, the overall pattern of results
suggests that excessively effortful action negatively colors
people’s subsequent judgments, and that this negative
valence spills over into the evaluation of ambient stimuli.
This ﬁnding complements the perceptual ﬂuency literature
(Alter and Oppenheimer 2009) by demonstrating that
effortful action processing also results in negative
evaluation.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst demonstration of
negative valence resulting from a simple yet effortful
action. However, a number of questions remain. First,
were negative evaluations of the ambient ﬁgures due
solely to the needless effort involved in moving the
mouse in the Effortful condition, or did participants
experience frustration (on a conscious or nonconscious
level; see Chartrand 2005)? Second, when participants
experienced the Effortful condition, could their violated
expectations of ease of action have contributed to their
negative evaluation of the ambient ﬁgures (again, instead
of a pure effect of action)? Third, is overt action neces-
sary to produce the observed valence effect, or can covert
mental actions also inﬂuence the evaluation of ambient
stimuli? To answer these questions and shed further light
on the nature of the valence from effort effect, we
examined whether covert mental actions (e.g., mentally
rotating an object) can negatively color evaluations in an
unintended fashion.
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Study 1 found negative valence effects from overt, physical
action, but do similar effects arise from covert, mental
actions, actions that are not associated with implicating
response suppression, physical exertion, expectations vio-
lation, or other aversive processes? Mental rotation is a
cognitive task involving a minimal amount of effortful
cognitive control, without implicating these secondary
effects (Morsella et al. 2009a). Hence, it is well suited for
studying the boundary conditions for the affective conse-
quences of cognitive effort. Based on mental rotation
paradigms (Shepard and Metzler 1971), participants in our
study had to determine whether two nonsense shapes were
different objects or the same object in a different orienta-
tion (Fig. 2), a task eliciting mental rotation. Such a
determination sometimes involved more effortful (135)o r
less effortful (45) mental rotation. As in the original
mental rotation studies, participants were never instructed
to rotate the objects. They were only asked if the two
shapes were the same or different. Thus, we would expect
no differential feelings of frustration across experimental
conditions, as the more or less effortful rotations only differ
in terms of the amount of processing. We hypothesized that
nonsense shapes associated with more effortful processing
(135 of mental rotation) would be liked less than shapes
associated with easier processing (45 of rotation).
Methods
Participants
Undergraduate students (n = 42) participated in a within-
subjects design for partial course credit.
Procedures
Stimuli (falling within 7 cm
2; Fig. 2) were presented on a
white background of an Apple iMac computer monitor
with a viewing distance of approximately 48 cm. Stimulus
presentation was controlled by PsyScope software (Cohen
et al. 1993). Task instructions did not mention mental
rotation. Participants were told, ‘‘Your task is to determine
whether the two objects are the same or different. Please
respond as quickly as possible by pressing the ‘S’ key if the
objects are the same (identical), or the ‘D’ key if the
objects are different.’’
Following the presentation of a sample ‘‘Same’’ and
‘‘Different’’ trial, participants began the test trials (n = 64)
in which, following each same/different judgment, the
shape reappeared in the center of the screen (in the orien-
tation in which it had appeared on the left-side of the
screen during the same/different task), and participants
were asked ‘‘How much do you like this object?’’ which
they rated on an 8-point scale, in which 1 signiﬁed ‘‘not at
all’’ and 8 signiﬁed ‘‘extremely like it.’’ Critical trials
(n = 32) showed the same object (i.e., all ‘‘Same’’ trials)
twice, with the object on the right rotated clockwise 45
(Easy Condition) or 135 (Effortful Condition). For the
effortful condition, we did not select the most extreme
angular displacement (180) because it would involve
having one object be the ‘upside down’ version of the
other, a transformation that, unlike that of 135, may have
peculiar psychological properties that could introduce
artifactual effects. For example, the upside-down versions
of a symbol may in-and-of-itself connote something neg-
ative (Jung 1964), as is obvious in the images of inverted
ﬂags, hearts, or religious icons. In designing the experi-
ment, we concluded that such a possibility could introduce
a confound. Second, having the object rotated on 180
keeps the object in the same vertical axis, which may lead
participants to attempt various strategies other than mental
rotation for carrying out the task. In synthesis, because we
wanted both conditions to be identical except for the
amount of rotation (and effort), we decided against pre-
senting images rotated 180 in the effortful condition, an
angular displacement that might have introduced more than
just a greater degree of rotation (and effort).
The pairing of stimuli to condition was fully counter-
balanced across participants, such that the shape that
appeared in the Easy condition for one participant appeared
in the Effortful condition for another participant. Due to a
programming error, regarding the critical trials, half of the
participants were presented with 17 Easy trials and 15
Effortful trials, and the other half were presented with 15
Easy trials and 17 Effortful trials. There was no meaningful
difference in any of the reported metrics based on this
difference between groups (all Fs\1), and the data were
collapsed. Filler trials (n = 32) were identical except that
they presented two distinct shapes. After the trials, partic-
ipants completed the funneled debrieﬁng questionnaire
from Study 1 (Bargh and Chartrand 2000). Funneled
debrieﬁng revealed that only one participant indicated
some awareness of the purpose of the study; the same
pattern of results is obtained with or without this partici-
pant’s data. Fig. 2 Sample stimuli used in the mental rotation task
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Consistent with the results of Study 1, participants reported
less liking for nonsense shapes when they were associated
with more mental rotation (Effortful condition M = 4.45,
SEM = 0.18) than with less mental rotation (Easy condi-
tion M = 4.60, SEM = 0.20), t(41) = 2.394, p=0.02,
gp
2 = 0.12). Participant typing errors resulted in the loss of
115 (8.6%) out of 1,344 ratings. As in previous mental
rotation studies, response times (ms) were longer for the
Effortful (M = 4616.43, SEM = 223.98) than Easy
trials (M = 4375.43, SEM = 225.54), t(41) =- 2.596,
p=0.01. As in Study 1, and potentially explained by
effects stemming from individual differences or the appe-
titive nature of difﬁcult goal pursuit (Cacioppo and Petty
1982; Brehm and Self 1989); see ‘‘General discussion’’),
the effect size (gp
2 = 0.12) may reﬂect individual differ-
ences regarding responses to effortful processing.
Same/different error rates were comparable between con-
ditions (MEasy = 0.09, SEM = 0.02; MEffortful = 0.08,
SEM = 0.01), t(41) = 0.198, p=0.84, suggesting that
valence did not stem from response accuracy. Even when
collapsing across the Easy and Effortful conditions, we
found no correlation between RT and likeability ratings,
r =- 0.08, p[0.05. This null correlational effect may be
due in part to a restriction of the range in RT caused by
their being only two rotation conditions, one limitation of
this study.
These ﬁndings suggest that in an executive task
involving covert action and occurring at the lower-bound-
ary of cognitively effortful experiences, greater effort leads
to negative affect. Building upon Study 1, these results lend
support to the hypothesis that on the most basic level,
greater effort is associated with negative affect, which is
capable of coloring people’s subsequent evaluations. These
results speak against an interpretation that violated
expectations produced the negative affect observed herein
(cf., MacDowell and Mandler 1989), as the Easy and
Effortful conditions differed only in terms of the amount of
mental rotation necessary to complete the task, for which
no a priori expectations existed within participants.
General discussion
As predicted by the valence from effort hypothesis
(Botvinick 2007; Hull 1943; Lewin 1935), in Study 1
participants liked ambient ﬁgures less when using a ‘slow’
computer mouse requiring a greater expenditure of effort
than when using a normal computer mouse. Similarly, in
Study 2 we demonstrated that, in a task involving a mini-
mal amount of effortful cognitive control, participants
liked stimuli associated with effortful processing (135
of mental rotation) less than those associated with easier
processing (45 of mental rotation). To our knowledge, this
is the ﬁrst demonstration of the affective consequences of
mental effort, resulting not from processing ﬂuency but
instead from the exercise of a basic form of cognitive
control. Together, these effects illuminate a simple mech-
anism—valence from effort—that may be one of many
sources of avoidance motivation giving rise to the behav-
ioral and decision-making patterns captured by the law of
least effort, a law that predicts so much of human behavior.
In both studies, the valence effect could not be attributed
to the peculiarities of the ﬁgures, because each ﬁgure was
presented an equal number of times in both the easy and
effortful conditions. In this way, any valence effects
stemming from the stimuli themselves should have been
aggregated away. Our counterbalancing method also con-
trolled for both stimulus-order and block-order effects.
Importantly, no participant reported explicit understanding
of the hypothesis being tested, suggesting that the effects
were not artifacts arising from experimental demand.
Limitations of the approach
One limitation of Study 1 is that our paradigm cannot pin-
point which aspect(s) of action implementation is primarily
responsible for valence effects. For example, valence may
arise from the online and continuous effort involved in
action execution/correction, impatience at the rate of pro-
gress by which the square moves across the screen as
function of each drag, or, more globally, from the inability
to quickly reach a goal state (having the square positioned at
the bottom right corner of the screen). For example, it could
be that a negative valence in Study 1 arose from perception
of the malfunctioning computer mouse. Similarly, in Study
2, valence may have been inﬂuenced by the relative ‘feel-
ings of success,’ which would be different for the two
conditions. More likely, the effect could have stemmed
from a combination of these factors. Nevertheless, at this
stage of understanding, we propose that it is the valence
from effort hypothesis that most parsimoniously accounts
for the ﬁndings of the two dissimilar tasks.
Future research may home in on the aspect(s) that are
most responsible for valence effects in this kind of sce-
nario. In both studies, the degree to which the nonsense
ﬁgure could be deemed to be ‘incidental’ remains unclear.
Do similar effects valence effects spill-over to objects that
are even more incidental? This question will have to be
addressed by future research involving target stimuli that
are less focal. One limitation of Study 2 is that only two
rotation conditions were used, thereby limiting statistical
analyses that could reveal a linear relationship between RT
and likeability. Studies 1 and 2 were designed to test in a
statistically powerful manner the prediction that the kinds
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cessing occur for processes involving action and executive
control. Future studies should be designed to reveal more
nuanced effects, for example, by having more gradations in
the levels of the experimental factor examined in Study 2.
It is important to note that the goal in this project was to
demonstrate that effortful, action-related processing can
create a negative valence that then inﬂuences likeability of
neutral, ambient stimuli. More theoretically, these data do
not directly support the claim that, in future action selec-
tion, valence acquired in this way will create avoidance
dispositions toward the tasks and stimuli that had been
associated with the effortful processing. Such a demon-
stration is left for future investigations.
As a predictor of behavior, one limitation of the law of
least effort is that organisms often do seek activities that,
though associated with the expenditure of energy, furnish
little, if any, energy as a payoff. In a cost-beneﬁt analysis,
these activities seem energy inefﬁcient, at least at ﬁrst
glance. For instance, Harlow et al. (1950) found that ani-
mals will lever press (an effortful act) to simply witness a
change in illumination. It is obvious that in humans,
energy-consuming activities are sought even when all the
needs of the organism are sated. This stimulation is sought
to counteract the negative affect associated with subopti-
mal arousal or ‘boredom’ (Berlyne 1960). The ethologists
have characterized these stimulation-seeking behaviors as
resulting from adaptive ‘exploratory drives’ (Thorpe 1964),
which can lead to a form of latent learning (Tolman and
Honzik 1930) that does have survival value for the
organism in the long run. Thus, the relationship between
valence and effort/conﬂict is probably more complicated
than that portrayed by traditional accounts (e.g., the law of
least effort; Botvinick 2007; Hull 1943). There are other
reasons for suspecting that effort does not always produce
negative feelings. For example, the experience of ‘ﬂow,’
the subjective experience of being completely immersed in
effortful cognitive or physical activity, is experienced
pleasantly (Csikszentmihalyi et al. 2005). Furthermore,
individuals high in a need for cognition express more
positive attitudes towards complex mental tasks, compared
to simple, less effortful tasks (Cacioppo and Petty 1982).
To explain such positive-valence from effort ﬁndings,
others have appealed to the homeostatic notion that the
cognitive apparatus strives to maintain an optimal level of
arousal (Kahneman 1973; see also the classic work by
Berlyne 1960). When below this threshold, arousal is
increased by engaging in activities such as ﬁddling with
objects or body parts (Morsella et al. 2010).
1 More
speciﬁcally, effort-related valence effects often depend on
background levels of neural ‘activation’ (Sanders 1983)
and homeostatic mechanisms concerned with optimal lev-
els of arousal (Berlyne 1960; Berlyne 1972; Morsella et al.
2009a; Kahneman 1973). For instance, in the midst of an
unchallenging, monotonous task (the kind of task com-
monly encountered in the psychology laboratory), partici-
pants may actually welcome cognitive conﬂict/interference
(Berlyne 1960; Berlyne 1970; Berlyne 1972; Kahneman
1973; Morsella et al. 2010; Riddle et al. 2009; Sanders
1983). For instance, some data suggest that, as time at task
increases, participants tend to dislike response interference
less and less (Riddle et al. 2009).
Furthermore, on the surface, the effects reported herein
also appear to conﬂict with the long line of research on
motivational intensity theory (Brehm et al. 1983; Brehm
and Self 1989; Wright 1996). A consistent ﬁnding in this
line of research is that goals become more, not less,
appetitive (and more intensely pursued) as the amount of
effort needed to achieve them increases. For example,
when given a free choice between food that was consis-
tently easier versus more difﬁcult to obtain, rats show a
preference for the difﬁcult-to-obtain food, suggesting that
more, not less, effort increased the attractiveness of the
goal (Friedman et al. 1968). Empirical ﬁndings such as
these led to the conclusion that, ‘‘[m]otivational arousal
rises with increasing difﬁculty of instrumental behavior up
to the point where the required effort is greater than jus-
tiﬁed by the motive’’ (Brehm and Self 1989, p. 129). Thus,
one might suspect that effortful action would be associated
with positive affect, an important precursor for goal pursuit
(Aspinwall 1998; Custers and Aarts 2005). However, a
consideration of the nature of the affective outcomes
associated with effortful action suggests that Brehm’s
energization theory can be reconciled with our present
analysis. Whereas motivational intensity theory deals pri-
marily with the consequences of task effort on goal
valence, we explore the affective consequences of effortful
action on the evaluation of incidental stimuli and secondary
outcomes that are not goals in themselves, but rather are
associated with the effortful (overt and covert) actions
themselves (i.e., means). In our paradigm, the shapes to-be-
rated were incidental and never constituted the goal:I n
Study 1, the goal was to move the square diagonally from
the top left corner of the computer screen to the bottom
right corner; in Study 2, the goal was to determine whether
the two visual stimuli were the same or different. Thus,
although effortful action may be associated with increased
goal pursuit (and enhanced desirability of end-states; cf.
Biner et al. 1991), such effort may also be capable of
producing ancillary negative emotions, which can inﬂuence
future action selection by decreasing liking for ambient
stimuli and secondary outcomes linked to the effortful
1 For an account regarding how these task-irrelevant activities
can actually facilitate certain cognitive tasks, see Olivers and
Nieuwenhuis (2005).
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123action (present analysis). In short, action difﬁculty may be
simultaneously energizing (leading to positive valence
toward the goal) and capable of instilling negative valence
toward incidental stimuli, which may then inﬂuence which
means are selected to reach the goal in the future.
Substantial research will be required to determine
whether apparent violations of the law of least effort result
from the homeostatic nature of the brain or, more speciﬁ-
cally, from exploratory drives that, though energy inefﬁ-
cient at one moment in time, may be adaptive in the long
run. In either case, the need to conserve energy must
always inﬂuence processing to some extent. Valence from
effort may instantiate such an inﬂuence. The (positive)
motivational consequences of effort may signal to the
organism that a goal is worth pursuing, whereas the (neg-
ative) affective consequences of effort may signal to the
organism when it is appropriate to abandon and cease goal
pursuit. Supporting this notion, recent work has found that
engendering a temporary implicit association between
negative affect and a goal leads to the cessation of the
nonconscious pursuit of that goal (Aarts et al. 2007).
Implications and future directions
Knowing when minimal mental effort will engender neg-
ative affect can be an important tool for cognitive-behav-
ioral treatments of neurological conditions such as multiple
sclerosis, in which depressed mood often plays a role
(Diamond et al. 2008). Furthermore, in educational and
workplace contexts, these results highlight the challenges
instructors and employers face, as the experience of neg-
ative affect can be a motivational hurdle (Carver et al.
1983; Dweck and Leggett 1988). Introducing appetitive
stimuli into these contexts rich with self-regulatory chal-
lenges may help overcome the negative affect produced by
cognitive effort (cf., Fredrickson and Losada 2005).
More generally, it remains unknown why the brain, as
an afﬁnity-based system (Chomsky 1988), comes to prefer
processing dynamics over others (Bindra 1959; Morsella
2005). It seems that metabolic processes (e.g., glucose
consumption) are too slow to be responsible for the chan-
ges in subjective experience (e.g., Sherrington’s sense of
effort; cf., Jeannerod 2006) that are associated with the
kinds of effortful situations that lead to valence effects. It is
our hope that our basic ﬁnding may spur investigations that
explain the neural underpinnings of the sense of effort and
its intimate relationship to valence. According to Botvinick
(2007), it is the anterior cingulate cortex that is responsible
for detecting this kind of ‘inefﬁcient processing’ that an
organism should later avoid. Together with this kind of
framework, and because so much is known about the
neural correlates of mental rotation (Gauthier et al. 2002),
the paradigm introduced in Study 2 may illuminate
pathological conditions. Such investigations may shed light
on conditions involving subjective fatigue, cognitive effort,
and negative valence (e.g., multiple sclerosis; Bailey et al.
1995).
Lastly, with respect to motivational intensity theory, it
may be interesting to ascertain whether goal energization
effects are simultaneously associated with greater liking of
difﬁcult-to-achieve goals (compared to easy-to-achieve
goals) and less liking of the effortful actions needed to
achieve those goals (compared to easy actions). Biner et al.
(1991) demonstrated that hungry participants valued a
cheeseburger more when successful completion of an
effortful (vs. easy) task was necessary to obtain it. Even
though participants evaluated the difﬁculty of the memory
task, participants did not report whether they liked the
difﬁcult memory task less than the easy task, which we
would predict based on the present ﬁndings. Future
research can better specify the affective consequences of
difﬁcult actions for evaluating means versus ends.
In summary, these two investigations suggest that at the
low extremes of physical and mental effort, needless,
excessive effort is associated with negative affect, standing
in contrast to other theoretical perspectives in which a high
degree of mental effort produces pleasant subjective
experiences (e.g., ﬂow; Csikszentmihalyi et al. 2005).
Given these ﬁndings, a more complete picture of the
affective consequences of mental effort emerges. Future
research can further examine the relationship between
cognitive effort and affect, by isolating the components of
the effortful experiences. For example, physiological
arousal may meaningfully contribute to the positive expe-
rience of effort at the upper boundary (cf., Berlyne 1960),
and when arousal is low, effort may induce positive affect
(cf., Kahneman 1973; Sanders 1983). On the most basic
level, however, it appears that the needless expenditure of
energy produces negative feelings.
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